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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DANIEL J. NIXON, ' 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
v. ; 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU ] 
CHIEF, DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION,1 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Defendant/Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
I Case No. 930549-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide appeals 
from district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
state agencies, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether Plaintiff/Appellant is required to exhaust his 
administrative remedies by requesting a hearing before the Appellee 
Drivers License Division prior to seeking judicial review of the 
administrative action of the Appellee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents a legal issue, and the lower court's 
statutory interpretation is accorded no deference. City of 
Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990), cert. 
denied, 49 U. S. 841 (1990). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Determinative statutory provisions are Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-
130 (Supp. 1992), recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 (Supp. 
1993), Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988), recodified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-3-224 (Supp. 1993), and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 
(1993) . These are set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order of Fourth District Judge Ray 
M. Harding dismissing the Plaintiff's Petition for Judicial Review 
of the administrative action by the Appellee that suspended the 
Appellant's driving privileges. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was arrested on December 2, 1992 for driving under 
the influence of alcohol, and served with Notice that the Drivers 
License Division would suspend his driving privileges unless he 
requested a hearing on the suspension (R. 22). It is undisputed 
that Appellant failed to request such a hearing and the Drivers 
License Division suspended the Appellant's driving privileges for 
a one-year period commencing December 31, 1992, as this was 
Appellant's second administrative suspension for driving under the 
influence (R. 22) . Appellant sought judicial review of the 
administrative action of the Drivers License Division pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-131 (1988) (recodified at § 53-3-224). The 
lower court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (R. 
27), and this appeal followed (R. 30). 
Contrary to the Appellant Nixon's assertions in his statement 
of facts, there is no evidence of any "actual" reliance on the 
Notice that he received or on any statutory provisions as the 
reason for his failure to seek an administrative hearing before the 
Drivers License Division. Further, any claim of reliance based 
upon the Notice of Agency Action, which told the Appellant how to 
seek judicial review, could not have been a factor as Appellant 
received that Notice subsequent to his failure to request a 
hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Administrative Procedure Act requires that an 
individual exhaust all administrative remedies prior to seeking 
judicial review. Appellant failed to request a hearing before the 
Drivers License Division, denying the Division the opportunity to 
review his claims. This failure to exhaust available 
administrative remedies divests the court of jurisdiction for 
judicial review. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED IT LACKED 
JURISDICTION BASED UPON APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
REQUEST A HEARING BEFORE THE DRIVERS LICENSE 
DIVISION. 
Appellant sought judicial review of the administrative 
suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
41-2-131 (1988). Judicial review of the administrative suspension 
is governed by the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to -22 (1993). Brinkerhoff 
v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990) . The provisions 
regarding judicial review under UAPA are set forth in section 63-
46b-14(2), which provides: 
2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except 
that: 
a) a party seeking judicial review need not 
exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statutes states that 
exhaustion is not required; 
b) the court may relieve a party seeking 
judicial review of the requirement to exhaust 
any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are 
inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
Under the statutory provisions relating to administrative hearings 
in driver license suspension cases, Appellant had the right and 
opportunity to be heard and to be granted a hearing pursuant to 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130(6) (Supp. 1992), but Appellant admittedly 
did not request a hearing. No "other statute" or the drivers 
license statute states that exhaustion is not required. 
The exhaustion requirement under UAPA is a codification of the 
long-standing law regarding review of administrative actions. As 
stated in Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989), 
[t]he law generally provides that parties must exhaust 
applicable administrative remedies as a prerequisite to 
seeking judicial review. Exceptions to this rule exist 
in unusual circumstances where it appears that there is 
a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is 
occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to 
review the alleged grievance or it appears that 
exhaustion would serve no usual purpose. 
See also S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) . 
The purpose behind requiring exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is to allow the administrative agency, which is charged 
with the enforcement of its laws, to review and make its 
determination based upon the facts and arguments presented by all 
interested persons. As stated in Maverik Country Stores v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993): 
The basic purpose underlying the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies "is to allow an 
administrative agency to perform functions within its 
special competence-to make a factual record, to apply its 
expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot 
judicial controversies." 
Id. at 947 (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972)), 
As also stated in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan; 
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It is well settled under [the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies] that persons aggrieved by 
decisions of administrative agencies "may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass" them, and call upon the courts to 
determine matters properly determinable originally by 
such agencies." 
797 P.2d at 1087 (quoting People v. Keith Rv. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 
244, 249 (Cal. App. 1945)). 
S & G involved an attempted appeal from the administrative 
decision, after hearing, of the state engineer. S & G did not 
participate at the administrative level, relying upon participation 
of another party with that had a similar interest, but then S & G 
sought judicial review of the decision and the other party did not. 
The statutory provisions there, similar to the provisions here, 
allowed for judicial review by trial de novo by "any person 
aggrieved by [the engineer's decision]." The Utah Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal based upon the failure of S & G to participate 
in the agency hearing and processes. To hold otherwise, the Court 
pointed out, would be contrary to the policy considerations 
applicable to all administrative decision-making: 
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures 
that those who have an interest will bring to the 
agency's attention all relevant facts and considerations 
at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover, the 
requirement of participation gives the agency and the 
other participants notice of the identity and concern of 
interested parties." 
Id. at 1087 (quoting Colorado Water Oual. Control Comm'n v. Town of 
6 
Frederick, 641 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1982)). 
Appellant admittedly failed to request a hearing before the 
Drivers License Division. As in Iverson, Appellant's failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies 
deprived the commission of the opportunity to hear, 
analyze, critically review, and possibility correct a 
matter within the purview of its particular 
responsibility and expertise. 
Iverson, 782 P.2d at 526. 
Appellant has no right to seek judicial review prior to 
exhausting his administrative remedies and without participating in 
the administrative processes. Further, he waived any potential 
right to judicial review of the agency's final action by refusing 
to participate and request a hearing at the administrative level. 
See S & G, Inc., 797 P.2d at 1088. 
Appellant places complete reliance upon Heinecke v. Dept. of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991), stating that the case 
holds that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required. 
This case is not controlling for two reasons. First, Heinecke 
involved a different issue - the requirement of a discretionary 
further internal administrative review after an administrative 
hearing and decision prior to seeking judicial review. In this 
case, the administrative remedy that Appellant failed to seek was 
the only administrative review, process and hearing within the 
statutory drivers license scheme. The Appellant was served with 
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the Drivers License Division notice of intention to suspend, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-13 0 (3) (1988). Upon written request he was 
entitled to a hearing, see Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-130 (6) (a) , and a 
suspension, "whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection," begins on the 30th day after arrest, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-130(7) (1988). In Heinecke, the agency had held a 
hearing in which Heinecke participated, the agency after review 
issued its ruling, and Heinecke's omission involved a mere failure 
to request further discretionary administrative review. 
Appellant's inaction here denied the administrative agency any 
opportunity to review at a hearing its decision whether to take 
action. 
The second reason that Heinecke is inapposite is because of 
the way it was decided. Heinecke's status and precedential weight 
and value was discussed in Maverik Country Stores. In Maverik, 
this the Court "acknowledged" some conflict between the holding 
there and Heinecke concerning exhaustion requirements. The 
Maverik Court noted that Heinecke was decided without the benefit 
of briefing and that the Court may need to revisit the issue of 
exhaustion requirements. Further, it explicitly stated: 
In Heinecke, however, we did not address 
the impact of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) 
(1989) which provides: "A party may seek 
judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available. . . . " 
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860 P.2d at 948 n.5. 
As noted, this case involves not merely a further 
discretionary review within an agency, but the only administrative 
hearing provided by statute. Further, Appellee addresses the issue 
concerning the explicit statutory language of UAPA requiring 
exhaustion of all administrative remedies, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(2) (1993), as well as the case law involving judicial 
interpretation of the well-established doctrine requiring 
exhaustion of administrative remedies. See S & G: Iverson. 
To adopt Appellant's position would allow any individual to 
completely by-pass administrative processes and not seek any review 
or hearing within an agency. It would prevent an agency from using 
its expertise or from reviewing its decisions in the light of an 
individual's claims, and it would allow the "person aggrieved" to 
go directly into court. This would significantly burden the court 
system and require the courts to become engaged in judicial 
determination of administrative decisions that may involve 
substantial "administrative discretion" - discretion which is to be 
exercised by the administrative agency, not a court. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant failed to request a hearing or otherwise avail 
himself of any of the administrative remedies or review. Such 
inaction constitutes a failure to exhaust his administrative 
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remedies, a waiver of his right to seek review, and the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction and authority to judicially review the agency 
action. Appellee therefore requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's order dismissing the petition for review. 
DATED this (<y^ day of May, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOM D. ROBERTS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Public Affairs Division 
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ADDENDUM 
41-2-130. Chemical test for driving under the influence 
Temporary license — Hearing and decision 
Suspension and fee — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated Section 41-6-44, the peace officer may, in 
connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a 
chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with the stan-
dards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar 
local ordinance adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission 
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 
shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, result in suspension or revo-
cation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a 
blood or breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is other-
wise in violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the 
test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
division, immediate notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's 
license to operate a vehicle. 
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division 
he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days; 
and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by the divi-
sion, basic information regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing 
before the division, 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the 
division, serve also as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the division indicating the 
chemical test results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has 
violated Section 41-6-44. 
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an op-
portunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request 
shall be made within ten days of the date of the arrest. 
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(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in 
which the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that 
the hearing may be held in some other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent 
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers. 
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(1) Any decision Ynade after a hearing before any number of the mem-
bers of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's 
license to operate a motor vehicle be suspended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this 
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the 
date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a 
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103, 
which shall be paid before the person's diriving privilege is reinstated, to 
cover administrative costs. This fee shall be cancelled if the person ob-
tains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspen-
sion was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under 
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for 
a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 41-2-131. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, ch. 129, § 2; renum-
bered by L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30, 
* 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 23, 1990, redesignated 
the former second and third sentences of Sub-
section (3) as present Subsection (4), former 
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (5)(a) to 
(5)(d), former Subsection (5) as present Subsec-
tion (6), the second sentence in former Subsec-
tion (5Kb) as present Subsections (6)(c)(i) to 
(6)(c)(in), the former third and fourth sen-
tences of former Subsection (5Kb) as present 
Subsections (€)(d) and (6Xe), former Subsection 
(5)(c) as present Subsections (6)(D and (6)(g), 
and former Subsections (5)(d) and (5)(e) as 
present Subsections (7), (8)(a), and (8Kb), sub-
stituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for "Subsec-
tion 41-2-112(6)" in the first sentence in 
present Subsection (8)(a), and made stylistic 
changes 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, in Subsection (4) added the (a) and (b) 
designations, redesignating former Subsec-
tions (4)(a) to (c) as Subsections (4)(a)(i) to (in), 
in Subsections (4)(a)(n) and (6)(a) substituted 
"29 days" for "30 days", subdivided Subsection 
(7), substituted "30th day" for "31st day"m 
both subsections, and substituted "one year" 
for "120 days"m Subsection (7Kb), and m Sub-
section (8Ka) substituted "41-2-112(15)" for 
"41-2-112(14)." 
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41-2-131. Judicial review of license cancellation, revoca-
tion or suspension. 
(1) Any person denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, sus-
pended, or revoked by the department may seek judicial review of the depart-
ment's order. 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the 
district court in the county where the person resides. Persons not residing in 
the state shall file in Salt Lake County or the county where the offense oc-
curred which resulted in the cancellation, suspension, or revocation. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, & 20; 1935, ch. 47, 
I 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7; C. 
1953, 41-2-20; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 
137, ft 31; 1987, ch. 161, § 138; 1987 (1st S.S.), 
ch. 8, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 137, renumbered this section 
which formerly appeared as § 41-2-20, substi-
tuted "division" for "department" throughout 
the section, divided the section into Subsec-
tions (1) and (2), and rewrote the section to the 
extent that a detailed analysis is impractica-
ble. 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 161, effec-
tive January 1,1988, rewrote the existing lan-
guage and designated it as Subsection (1), and 
added Subsection (2). 
Meaning of "department". — See note un-
der same catchline following § 41-2-118. 
Legislative Intent — Laws 1987 (1st S.S.), 
ch. 8, § 6 states the legislative intent that 
§ 41-2-131 be superseded by the provisions of 
§ 41-2-20 (now this section) in Laws 1987, 
Chapter 161, when that act becomes effective 
January 1, 1988. 
787 PUBLIC SAFETY 53-3-224 
53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the in-
fluence — Temporary license — Hear-
ing and decision — Suspension and fee 
— Judicial review. 
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person may be violating or has 
violated Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the opera-
tion of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath 
alcohol concentration and driving under the in-
fluence of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a 
drug and alcohol, the pe;ace officer may, in con-
nection with arresting the person, request that 
the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be 
administered in compliance with the standards 
under Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 
41-6-44 includes any similar local ordinance 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 
41-6-43(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to 
the person's submission to a chemical test that a test 
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall, 
and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient 
to render the person incapable of safely driving a mo-
tor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of 
the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the 
test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol content 
in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer makes 
a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that 
the person is otherwise in violation of Section 
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the 
test or making the determination shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of 
the division's intention to suspend the person's li-
cense to drive a motor vehicle. 
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice 
on behalf of the division he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per-
mit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate 
effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be 
approved by the division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing 
before the division, 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if ap-
proved as to form by the division, serve also as 
the temporary license certificate. 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice 6hall send 
to the division within five days after the date of ar-
rest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the 
division indicating the chemical test results, if 
any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated Section 41-6-44. 
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall 
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard 
within 29 days after the date of arrest. The re-
quest to be heard shall be made within ten days 
of the date of the arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the divi-
sion in the county in which the arrest occurred, 
unless the division and the person agree that the 
hearing may be held in some other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall 
cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe the person was driving a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test; and s; 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the divi 
sion or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may is-
sue subpoenas for the attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of relevant 
books and papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the at-
tendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and 
mileage from the Transportation Fund in ac-
cordance with the rates established in Sec-
tion 2-15-4. 
(e) One or more members of the division may 
conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before 
any number of the members of the division is as 
valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order 
whether the person's license to drive a motor ve-
hicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held 
fails to appear before the division as required in 
the notice, the division shall order whether the 
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is sus-
pended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not 
challenged under this subsection, is for a period 
of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the 
date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under 
this subsection is for a period of one year, begin-
ning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, 
in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 
53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a 
fee under Section 53-3-105 to cover administra-
tive costs, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be 
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed di-
vision hearing or court decision that the suspen-
sion was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended 
by the division under this subsection may file a 
petition within 30 days after the suspension for a 
hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed 
by Section 53-3-224. iss3 
53-3-224. Filing a petition for hearing — Judi-
cial review of license cancellation, re-
vocation, or suspension — Scope of re-
view. 
(1) A person denied a license or whose license has 
been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division 
may seek judicial review of the division's order. 
(2) (a) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings is in the district court in the 
county where the person resides. 
(b) Persons not residing in the state shall file 
in Salt Lake County or the county where the of-
fense occurred, which resulted in the cancella-
tion, suspension, or revocation. isas 
